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L

egal
researchers
constantly

deal with issues of

authority. Did the
police have
authority to search
the car? Is this
court of appeals
decision binding
authority on my
case? What statutes
are authoritative in
my jurisdiction?
These questions are
important, and
librarians often
help find answers.
The question of
authority that
librarians are best
equipped to
answer, however, is
"How authoritative
is this source?"
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In addition to helping students and
public patrons find the sources that
contain answers to their questions,
academic and public law librarians teach
researchers how to evaluate whether a
source is indeed what it claims to be.
We teach students that decisions of the
supreme court override those of a court
of appeals (except in New York, where
the opposite is true). We tell researchers
that a provision of the us. Code is more
authoritative than an inconsistent
provision of the Code ofFederal
Regulations. And Nimmer on Copyright
is a better authority than a newspaper
article.

it was designated by the judges for
publication. The distinction between
precedential and non-precedential (or
published and unpublished) opinions
shows that what counts as legal authority
is limited by other legal rules.
For most researchers, precedential
and non-precedential opinions are now
equally accessible. Opinions marked as
precedential by judges are published in
West reporters, but non-precedential
opinions are also published in major
legal databases and on court websites.
Further highlighting the anachronism of
dubbing an opinion unpublished is that
some non-precedential opinions are

The question of authority that librarians are best equipped to answer,
however, is "How authoritative is this source?"

Beyond these broad and simple
statements, though, lie more subtle
distinctions of authority less frequently
encountered but nonetheless important
for many researchers. This article
discusses three such distinctions:
precedential versus non-precedential
opinions, positive versus prima facie law,
and professor-written versus studentwritten law journal articles.
Other examples surely exist, and
while some patrons may think such
distinctions are needless nit-picking,
there are times when such questions
of authority will affect their research.
Librarians do not need to drill students
and patrons with charts listing every
miniscule ranking of authority, but we
do a disservice to our patrons by not
mentioning these distinctions when
relevant.
Each of these examples also
illustrates a general principle of
evaluating legal sources' authority that
we should teach our patrons. Just as law
professors teach students to spot the
right issues in a legal problem, we should
instruct researchers to ask the right
questions to decide how authoritative a
source is and whether it can answer their
questions.

Precedential versus Nonprecedential Court Opinions
(Authority is Limited by Rules)
Some distinctions of legal authority are
pretty intuitive. The laws in Nevada have
very little effect in Indiana, for example.
Likewise, a decision of the Nevada
Supreme Court is unlikely to have any
authority in an Indiana court. Less
intuitive, though, is that whether an
Indiana Court of Appeals decision can
be cited as authority depends on whether

published in the Federal Appendix, a
print reporter.
If there is no difference in access,
whether an opinion can be cited as
authority depends solely on the court's
rules. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
(FRAP) 32.1 provides that all opinions
issued after January 1, 2007, can be cited;
before that, one must look to circuit and
local court rules. (For more background
on FRAP 32.1, see Amy E. Sloan's article,
'''If You Can't Beat 'Em, Join 'Em:' A
Pragmatic Approach to Nonprecedential
Opinions in the Federal Appellate
Courts," in the Volume 86, Number 4
issue of Nebraska Law Review.) State
courts are also divided on the citation of
non-precedential opinions.
Researchers looking for controlling
precedents need to understand that
just as an on-point (or even a close to
on-point) high court decision is virtually
always better than on-point intermediate
or trial court decisions, so are
precedential opinions preferable to
non-precedential opinions. Experienced
attorneys generally know this, but
students and lay researchers may need to
be alerted to the distinction before they
rely upon a case that is less authoritative
than they think.
Fortunately, most non-precedential
opinions are easily identified by the
prominent notices on the documents.
Simply instructing researchers to prefer
decisions without such notices will help
avoid confusion and disappointment.
More generally, though, librarians should
teach researchers that different legal
systems permit different kinds of
authority. If a researcher remembers to
ask what authorities are permitted in a
given case, many fruitless research paths
will be avoided.
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Positive versus Prima Facie Law
(Errors Can Occur in Sources)
Non-precedential opinions are easy to
spot due to the notices and their
exclusion from reporters of precedential
opinions. Distinguishing between
positive and prima facie law is more
difficult. The clearest markings of
positive and prima facie laws are not
where most researchers would think to
look-on the front matter of the printed
volumes of the Statutes at Large and in
the table of contents of the Us. Code,
where asterisks are placed next to titles
enacted as positive law.
The Statutes at Large are positive
law-whatever text is in those volumes is
the law. When Congress makes a mistake
or a typographical error creeps into the
Statutes at Large, Congress can only fix it
by enacting a law that corrects the error.
Much of the US. Code is prima facie
law, which means the text in the Us.
Code is presumed to be the law, but it
can be trumped by any inconsistent text
that may exist in the Statutes at Large.
Some titles of the us. Code have been
enacted as positive law, so for those titles
no recourse can be made to the Statutes
at Large.
The compilers in the Office of the
Law Revision Counsel generally do a
very good job of codifying the Statutes
at Large into the us. Code, so most of
the time there is no effective difference
between the session laws and code.
However, in the years since the first
Us. Code was published in 1926, errors
have been found that were material to
actual cases. Mary Whisner recounts
several of these cases and notes that
hundreds of errors were found in the
draft codifications leading up to the
publication of the US. Code in her Fall
2009 Law Library Journal "Practicing
Reference" column, "The United States
Code, Prima Facie Evidence, and Positive
Law."
Some legislators insisted that the
Us. Code be prima facie evidence of
the law because they knew that errors in
important legal materials were inevitable.
Better technology has certainly reduced
the incidence of errors, but mistakes
have been found in major legal
databases, too. Librarians don't need to
teach the difference between prima facie
and positive law when introducing
session laws and statutory codes, but we
should teach the underlying point that
no source is immune to mistakes.
We should instill a healthy level
of caution and an understanding that
relying on a source involves a certain,
even if miniscule, level of risk. In most
circumstances, looking at a reliable and
well-maintained code, official or
unofficial, will suffice. Hanging a legal
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argument on a code provision quoted in
a book or article is a riskier proposition,
and if one's key argument depends on
the precise wording of a clause, then
checking the positive law copy is
worthwhile.
Researchers don't need to insist on a
certified copy of every statute, but they
do need to know every copy of a law
they find is not equally accurate, and
they should seek to use the most
trustworthy copy they can reasonably
obtain. Awareness of the risk of errors
in legal documents will lead researchers
to seek well-maintained copies of legal
documents, like judicial opinions,
administrative regulations, and
international agreements. Librarians
are prepared to meet this demand by
directing researchers to official or
unofficial but reputable print codes,
government websites like FDSys
(fdsys.gov), or well-known private
websites like the Legal Information
Institute (law.comell.edu).

to the education and experience of the
author. Of course, an excellent indicator
of authority is solid legal analysis and
evidence. Experienced researchers in
familiar territory will know this when
they see it, but researchers new to legal
research or striking out into a new field
will need signs of authority that do not
presuppose a solid grounding in the
relevant Ii terature.
A few names have become highly
authoritative brands (such as Nimmer
for copyright or LaFave for criminal
procedure), but these are rare, so
librarians need to teach researchers to
look for indicators of authority in
secondary sources. In addition to the
author's credentials, another sign of an
article's authority is citation by courts or
other scholars. This can be discovered
through major legal databases or Google
Scholar.
If a researcher is thinking of citing a
secondary source as authority, seeing that
others have already done so is a good
sign. Citation metrics have their own

We should instill a healthy level of caution and an understanding that relying
on a source involves a certain, even if miniscule, level of risk.

Professor-written versus
Student-written Articles (Who
Made the Source Matters)
When considering the authority of
different copies of primary legal sources,
the more closely a copy matches the
current text of the original legal
document, the more authoritative it
is. For secondary sources, authority is
determined largely by the educational
and professional credentials of the
authors.
In the genre of academic law journal
articles, writings by legal scholars and
practitioners are generally regarded as
more authoritative than pieces written by
law students. The differences of authority
between scholar-written and studentwritten articles are murky; courts have
cited articles by both professionals and
students. Student-written work is often
not clearly labeled as such, and novice
researchers may not know that notes,
comments, and unsigned writings are
generally by student authors.
Regardless of the formal labeling of
an article, a good way for researchers to
evaluate an article's authority is to look

•
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weaknesses, as does depending solely
on the imprimatur of an established
publisher. No one of these proxies for
authority will serve on its own, but
taking a few together will get researchers
closer to authoritative secondary sources
and help them recognize authoritative
works when they come across them.
The same principles apply for online
secondary sources. Much legal
commentary now is published exclusively
online in blogs, online supplements to
print journals, and solely digital journals.
For many researchers, print still carries
a greater air of authority, but plenty of
online sources are perfectly authoritative.
Librarians should remind researchers to
check for indicators that the author
knows what she is talking about,
regardless of the source's format.

Conclusion
Looking for answers to legal questions
often requires sifting through a variety
of sources, some more authoritative
than others. Not all researchers need to
know about the differences between
precedential and non-precedential
opinions, positive and prima facie law,

or professional-written and studentwritten articles. The principles that
underlie these distinctions-legal rules
affect what counts as authoriry, errors
can occur in any source, and the author's
identity matters-will help researchers
choose good sources for any project.
Much legal instruction occurs when
answering a reference query. When
answering a question, a librarian can
thread these principles into her
description of the relevant source and
her explanation of why the source is
likely to be helpful. The distinction
between precedential and nonprecedential opinions need only be
brought up if the researcher states she
has found the answer and presents a
non-precedential opinion. Then it would
be appropriate to suggest checking the
relevant court rules on citing nonprecedential opinions and perhaps a bit
more digging for a precedential opinion
with a similar holding.
The proper time and extent of
instruction on appraising authority will
depend on the researcher's knowledge,
research goal, and access to legal
materials. What is best for experienced
attorneys will be different from what is
best for students. The same is true for
laypersons. All researchers, though, have
a common need to access and recognize
authoritative sources. Librarians can
meet this need by explaining these
principles when recommending sources
or reviewing materials the researcher has
already found.

Librarians should remind
researchers to check for indicators
that the author knows what she
is talking about, regardless
of the source's format.

The distinctions of authority we
find might seem like splitting hairs to
students and public patrons, but as long
as they are grounded in solid principles
for selecting the most authoritative
source available, we will help researchers
find sources that best fit their needs . •
Benjamin]. Keele (bjkeele@wm.edu)
is a reference librarian at William 6- Mary
School ofLaw in Williamsburg, Virginia.

